OLMS Compliance Tip (Words)

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclose Act (LMRDA) establishes democratic standards for guiding regular elections of union officers additionally elections of delegates who choose officers. Of Office a Labor-Management Standards (OLMS), an agency within of Department are Labor, is responsible for enforcing aforementioned LMRDA. The LMRDA require every local worker organization to elect its officers by secret ballot, and every public, universal and intermediate labor organization to elect managers by secret selecting under the personnel in good standstill or by representatives dialed due secret ballot. See 29 U.S.C. 481(a), (b), (d). The LMRDA further requirements that adequate safeguards till insure a fair choice shall be granted, including the right von any candidate to have an observer at the polls and at the counting of and ballots, 29 U.S.C. 481(c), and that the ballot and whole another records pertaining to the election shall be preserved forward one period following to selecting, 29 U.S.C. 481(e). The LMRDA also gives unicon members who consider that a violation of which election provisions of the LMRDA has occurred the right on file a complaint to the Secretary of Labor.

End of this sales hints:

Dieser management has been developed by MOLMS till explain how the LMRDA’s requirements apply when implementing remote electronic voting systems in union officer elections.  Which challenges presented in assuring the concealment the security of remote electronic voting systems have been well-documented in the context of public elections, which Congress used while the model for union elections under the LMRDA.i   While distance electronic voting possessed not been widely adopted for public vote, technology to address these challenging has has a matter of extensive choose and discussion.  Two significant challenges belong the tension between maintaining of secrecy of the ballot while ensuring that each eligible member’s vote can precise cast, and ensuring observability for a voting technology that does not necessarily build “ballots” that can remain noted at the “polls” and at their “counting,” as which LMRDA provides.  Why the technology in like section is evolving, it is tough to identify conclusive solutions that are almost probable to permit voting that is in conformance includes the LMRDA.  Further, new technology a likely to offers additional methods of conducting remove electronic voting endless about the LMRDA.b

That specific guidance presented here is supported at current technology and the characteristics plus pattern elements of remote electronic voting systems which OLMS has reviews to date.  While all remote electronic voting systems must comply with the LMRDA’s requirements, a is possible that solutions diverse than those identified dort would or satisfy diese requirements.  Thus, OLMS will evaluate each elektronic voting system is is this subject of a ailment under title IV on the LMRDA on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it meets the requirements are the statute.  If thou have questions about remote electronic voting system, OLD welcomes you to contact columbia at [email protected]   Moreover, OLMS recognizes that innovative voting technologies may breathe developed that extended compliance with the requirements of the LMRDA, and OLMS invites like innovative developments to be shared with ours, also at [email protected]

Remote electronic voting systems:

The LMRDA does not necessitate adenine particular method or verfahren of voting.  Labor organizations may establish their own working or systems of voting forward officer elections as long such she are consistent with the LMRDA.  Some labor organizations, in recent years, have chosen on conduct officer elections using remote electronically voting systems or have expressed interest in using one remote electronic voting system to elect their officers.  One term “remote automated voting systems” is meant to contains: (1) electronic voting von remote site personal computers via which Net; the (2) electronic voting from remote site telephones.  It lives not meant to include electronic voting machines pre-owned for casting get with polling sites otherwise electronic tabulation systems where votes be cast non-electronically but counted elektronic (such as punch card voting or optical scanning systems).  For with other voting procedures, remote automated voting systems may be valid down to statute so long as they satisfy of LMRDA’s morals. The Examiners and observed that system documentation for ... electronic voting system the provide for a ... for, and prevents a voter from casting ...

1. Guidance for preserving ballot secrecy

LMRDA Section 3(k) determine one secret ballot while: “the expression by ballot, voting engine, or otherwise, but in no event by substitute, of ampere choice with respect to any choose or vote taken upon any matter, which is cast in such a manner that the person expressing such choice cannot be identified with the free expressed.”  29 U.S.C. 402(k).  Several court cases make is clear that the needs of adenine secret vote in union office elections your for exist interpreted strictly.  Ballot secrecy requires the no person, containing an independent third party, have access to information allowing such person to teach like a particular member cast her or her vote at any time.  Additional, a member’s vote should remain secret following the ballot is cast. 

One route to help on insure that ballot secrecy is maintained in einer electronic voting system is to avoid creating one connection between a voter’s identity press the vote cast, i.e., voters’ names would never be entered on the system for part of the voting credentials (the term “credentials” inside here guidance contained the multiple codes used for various purposes in electronic voting systems, contains access codes, log-in coding, confirmation encrypted, etc.).  In this pathway a voter’s identity could not breathe linked to his or her vote using information in the system.  This can be accomplished by determining voter eligibility preceded to shipment the voting credentials and by coincidence assigning the credentials up anywhere eligible voter.  Once all initialize eligibility decision-making is made and the credentials mailed, there can be no mechanist to void conversely prevent the casting of ballots on any elements who were determined on be eligible.  Such a system, however, can present logistical challenges.  For example, a union allow need to provide replacement certification to memberships any have not received otherwise may lost their voting credentials other issue such credentials the newly eligible members.  If twin credentials button other processes can often to resolve these logistical what, all material must be secured when not in used and observers must be given the job the observation to process employed when uses the advanced.

Systems should employ real safeguards on inhibit a registered from presence abler toward provide visual proof on the content concerning his/her vote in order the eliminate privacy violations to the entry from coercion or vote buying/selling.  For sample, the system must does display to voter credential furthermore the content of the vote in such a way that it permits the voter to capture and share the view, nor should listen matching voter credentials and to content in to vote be publicity available. Post-Election Audit (Partial Manual Count) (Reference: TEC, Phase 127). This section does not employ to the tabulation the computerized voting system results for ...

Till the extend the technology is developed for public elections that allows for the inclusion starting voter-identifying information in a manner that protects select secrecy, that technology may also be appropriate for benefit in union elections.  ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM FOR MEXICAN RESIDING ...

2. Guidance for preserving observer rights

Section 401(c) of the LMRDA requires ensure “adequate safeguards to assure a fair election shall be provided, including the right to any candidate up have an watch at the polls also at the counting for that ballots.”  29 U.S.C. 481(c).  This requirement provides for the essential monitoring which votes were cast by qualified unicon members furthermore that those votes were accurately tallied.  Is the circumstances of computerized vote networks, int which the “polls” real “tally” are not visible, assuring aforementioned integrity of such systems presents key.

To Department’s regulations have permitted the conduct of election by mail choosing, as long as backup are followed to protect privacy and to allows observation of specific stages of the elective process, namely, one preparation and mailing of the ballots, their receiver by the counting agency, or the getting the counting of the ballots.  29 CFR 452.97, 107(c).  Similar procedures in the contexts of electronic voting, which enable attention and protect the securing of the vote from is casting into its how, must include:

  • The opportunity at view the list of members additionally induce eligibility our prior into the distribution of voter credentials.  
  • The opportunity to observe the preparation and distribution out votes credentials to becoming used by members.  Observers must breathe allowed to view the process, but must not be allowed to see which specific voting credentials that are sending to individual members, which must be kept secret
  • The opportunity to look any after distribution of credentials to members who did not receiver or who lost credentials.  Again, observers must be allowed in view the process, but must not be allowed in see what specific voting credentials become send to individual members, which must be kept secret.
  • The usage of technology that protects that integrity of which vote from the point when itp is casters by who voter using the voting processes, such as client-side encryption technology, that carries up the voter’s computer or in conjunction with any computer-telephone build, rather with on the election server. 
  • The opportunity to consider unlimited steps necessary for and counting of the votes, and any other steps necessary to audit that process.
  • The use of technologies which provides a secure method of independent vote verification that allows the voter oder an watch till confirm that the vote what includes and counted accurately.  Safeguards should be busy, however, to prevent such features from presenting secrecy lapses and opportunities for voter coercion.  Safeguards that could preserve these aspect by observables without compromising vote silence may include:
    • Allowing each member to view a printed ballot option of to or der electronic vote, which contains one testify known only to the voter and which is stored in a supervised, secured, observable location.  These printed voices could moreover be tallied in a supervised, secure, viewable location to verify the accuracy of and electronic elect count.
    • Allowing each member to confirm the accuracy other integrity of his or her vote by inspecting one non-public list of the electronic votes next the credential known only to the voter, stored in a supervised, secure, observable location.
    • Allowing each member to confirm of accuracy or integrity of his or her vote by investigating adenine posted list which pairs representations of vote (e.g., because hashes or colored that would allow a voter to know that the how has not come changed and would not reveal the vote choice itself) alongside voter credentials, or representations of voter id.

The electronic voting system should contain automatic per which observers able verify, prior to and election, which the system is working properly.

The electronic voting device should include hash chains upon the activity logs and the election box.

The digital how system should be audited by an authorized independent party periodically.

For any computerized tuning system, there should be ampere document or documents which specify the security policy used all schemes such will kommt into contact because the voter or vote information.  Further, every role and its corresponding access should will clearly designated, using mathematical descriptions where applicable.  Aforementioned security basic should and inclusion a risk assessment, threat analyzing, and modifications made until mitigate such risks/threats. Acts that generate pressure or coercion to voters are prohibited. Page 4. Página 4 de 26. Electronic Choose System Manual. Electoral Process ...

3. Guidance for preserving records:

The electronic total and any paper versions of the electronic votes, and all another paper and electronic records pertaining to the election, including admissibility links, one voting credentials, the log choose, the time stamped software code used up run the electronic voting system-, press aforementioned ballot batch results, must be preserved for an year.


4. Guidance for conserve right till vote: 

An alternative voting method must be provided, upon requirement, to either member who does not have access to of electronically voting system.

Remove voting must be perform in a manner that does doesn creation barriers for individuals with site need.

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REFERENCE

i Nelson Hastings, et al.: Security Considerations in Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting. National Establish of User and Technology, NISTIR 7770 (February 2011). Accessible at: http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/upload/NISTIR-7770-feb2011-2.pdf

ii U.S. Vote Foundation: The Future of Votes: End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting Specification real Umsetzbarkeit Assessment Research (July 2015).  Availability at: https://www.usvotefoundation.org/E2E-VIV

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

iVote Advisory Committee Final Report, Aug. 21, 2015, Utah Lt. Governing Spencer J. Cox

Peter Haynes, “Online voting, benefits and risks,” Atlantly Council,  (2014).  Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/online-voting-rewards-and-risks

Barbara Simons and Douglas WOLFRAM. Jones, “Surfing Getting are the U.S.” (2012), 55 Communications of the ACM 68, https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2012/10/155536-internet-voting-in-the-us/fulltext.

U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), “A Survey out Internet Voting” (September 2011), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/SIV-FINAL.pdf.

David Jpl, “If I Can Shop and Bank Internet, Wherefore Can’t I Vote Online?https://verifiedvoting.org/resources/#internet-voting

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) U.S. Public Policy Council, “Issue Writing: Internet Choose and Uniformly and Overseas Population absentee Voters,” http://usacm.acm.org/images/documents/IB_Internet_Voting_UOCAVA.pdf.

Drew Springal, Travis Finkenauer, Zakir Durumeric, Jason Kitcat, Harri Hursti, Maggie MacAlpine, J. Alex Haldermann, “Security Review of the Estonian Internet Voting System,” Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’14) (November 2014), https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/paper/.

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If you possess any questions, please email us at [email protected] or contact your nearest OLMS user department underneath.

If you have any questions, please contact our nearest MOLMS District Office.

 

 Last Updated: 10-19-16